In 1976 Stephen Hawking proposed that information may be lost from our universe as a pure quantum state collapses gravitationally into a black hole, which then evaporates completely into a mixed state of thermal radiation. Although this proposal is controversial, it is tempting to consider analogous processes that might occur in certain theories of consciousness. For example, one might postulate that independent degrees of freedom be ascribed to the mental world to help explain the feeling of a correlation between one's desires and one's choice of actions. If so, one might ask whether information in the physical world can be lost to such postulated degrees of freedom in the mental world. Or, one might hypothesize that the mental world can affect the physical world by modifying the quantum action for the physical world in a coordinate-invariant way (analogous to the alpha parameters in wormhole theory).
As a result of his 1974 calculation [1, 2] of thermal emission from black holes, Hawking argued [3] that a pure quantum state that underwent gravitational collapse into a black hole would end up as a mixed quantum state of thermal radiation. This proposal has continued to be controversial, and in the conference lecture being reported here, I discussed various alternatives and arguments for and against them. However, as I have little to add in print to these arguments since my recent review of this subject [4] and subsequent research paper [5] , here I shall instead briefly turn to some analogous ideas that I have been considering concerning consciousness.
I have developed a framework, which I call Sensible Quantum Mechanics, for relating conscious perceptions to the quantum state of the universe and for interpreting quantum mechanics. Since the basics of this framework are also to be published elsewhere [6, 7] , here I shall merely summarize it briefly and then consider some speculations that go beyond it in a way that is somewhat analogous to the suggestion of information loss in black holes.
Sensible Quantum Mechanics is given by the following two basic postulates: Measure Axiom for Perceptions: There is a fundamental measure µ(S) for each subset S of the "mental world," the set M of all perceptions p.
Sensible Quantum Axiom: The measure µ(S) is given by the expectation value of an "awareness operator" A(S), a positive-valued-operator (POV) measure [8] , in the quantum state of the "physical world":
µ(S) = A(S) = ψ|A(S)|ψ = T r[A(S)ρ],
Here the third expression applies if the quantum state is represented by the wavefunction or pure state |ψ , and the fourth expression applies if the quantum state is represented by the statistical operator or density matrix ρ. (The second expression can apply in more general situations, such as in C * -algebra.) Since all sets S of perceptions with µ(S) > 0 really occur in this framework, it is completely deterministic if the quantum state and the A(S) are determined: there are no random or truly probabilistic elements in this framework of Sensible Quantum Mechanics. Nevertheless, because the framework has measures for sets of perceptions, one can readily use them to calculate quantities that can be interpreted as conditional probabilities. One can consider sets of perceptions S 1 , S 2 , etc., defined in terms of properties of the perceptions. For example, S 1 might be the set of perceptions in which there is a feeling that the universe is approximately described by a Friedman-Robertson-Walker model, and S 2 might be the set of perceptions in which there is a feeling that the age of the universe (at the perceived time) is between ten and twenty billion years. Then one can interpret
as the conditional probability that the perception is in the set S 2 , given that it is in the set S 1 . In our example, this would be the conditional probability that a perception including the feeling that the universe is approximately described by a Friedman-Robertson-Walker model, also has the feeling that at the time of the perception the age is between ten and twenty billion years. Thus in Sensible Quantum Mechanics, probabilities don't (apply to) "matter"; they are only in the "mind."
In order to get quantities associated with a single perception p and to test and compare different theories, assume the set M of perceptions is a suitable topological space with a prior measure
Let
A rather natural hypothesis to add to the basic framework of Sensible Quantum Mechanics is that each E(p), which I call a perception operator, is a projection operator P (p) onto an 'eigenstate of perception' (perhaps a technically 'unphysical' state, one that does not obey the constraint equations, such as the Wheeler-DeWitt equations, since presumably P (p) would not commute with the constraints, but this makes no difference for calculating its expectation value so long as one has an inner product on the full space of unconstrained states). However, one can think of many other possible restrictions on the form of E(p) [6, 7] .
Some possibilities for the prior measure µ 0 (S) are the following: 
g ij dp i dp j = T r{[E(p i + dp
Now agreement with observation can be tested by the typicality of one's perception p: Let S ≤ (p) be the set of perceptions p ′ with m(p ′ ) ≤ m(p). Then one can, in a rather ad hoc way, define a 'typicality'
which, in the case in which m(p) varies continuously, has a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 for p chosen randomly with the infinitesimal measure dµ(p). Therefore, using this particular criterion and assuming that one's perception p is indeed typical in this regard, one might say that agreement with observation requires that the prediction, by the theory in question, of T (p) for one's observation p be not too much smaller than unity.
One could of course instead use any other property of perceptions which places them into an ordered set to define a corresponding 'typicality.' For example, I might be tempted to order them according to their complexity, if that could be well defined. Thinking about this alternative 'typicality' leaves me surprised that my own present perception seems to be highly complicated but apparently not infinitely so. What simple complete theory could make a typical perception have a high but not infinite complexity?
However, the 'typicality' defined by Eq. (11) has the merit of being defined purely from the prior and fundamental measures, with no added concepts such as complexity that would need to be defined. Furthermore, if one makes one of the proposals of Eq. (7)- (10), then both the fundamental and the prior measures are determined by the quantum state and by either the awareness operators A(S) or by the perception operators E(p), so the number of basic elements is rather minimal.
Returning to the definition given by Eq. (10) for the typicality, one can use a Bayesian approach and assign prior probabilities P (H i ) to hypotheses H i that give particular theoretical predictions for a measure density m i (p) over all perceptions and hence assign a particular typicality T i (p) to one's perception. (For example, one might choose to set P (H i ) = 2 −n i , where n i is the rank of H i in order of increasing complexity, in order to give the simpler theories higher prior probabilities. To do this, one would need to assume some particular background knowledge whith respect to which one might define 'complexity.') Although a perception p can be said to exist in each theory that gives m i (p) > 0, so that the existence of the perception has unit probability in each, one can instead take the typicality of the perception and interpret its probability of being so small, which is T i (p) itself (since the typicality has a uniform distribution), as the probability associated with the perception p in the hypothesis H i . This may then be called the likelihood of H i given p. By Bayes' rule, the posterior conditional probability that one should then rationally assign to the hypothesis H i , if one followed this prescription of interpreting the typicality as the conditional probability (given the hypothesis H i ) for one's particular perception p, would be
There is the potential problem that the right side of Eq. (11) may have both numerator and denominator infinite, which makes the typicality T i (p) inherently ambiguous. Then one might use instead
for some set of perceptions S containing p that has µ i (S) finite for each hypothesis H i . This is a practical limitation anyway, since one could presumably only hope to be able to compare the measure densities m(p) for some small set of perceptions rather similar to one's own. Unfortunately, this makes the resulting P (H i |p) depend on this chosen S as well as on the other postulated structures.
In Sensible Quantum Mechanics, the measure for all sets S of perceptions in the mental world is determined by the physical world (i.e., the quantum state), along with the awareness operators. This seems to leave mysterious the correlation between will and action: why do I do as I please? That is, why is my desire to do something I feel am capable of doing apparently correlated with my perception of actually doing it? One might seek to explain this by going beyond Sensible Quantum Mechanics to a framework, say to be called Sensational Quantum Mechanics, in which the mental world acts back on the physical world.
One way in which this could be done, going beyond the framework of Sensible Quantum Mechanics without violating it, would be for desires in the mental world to affect the action functional that is used in a particular Feynman path integral to define the quantum state. If this modification of the action were done in a coordinate-invariant way, it would not violate local energy-momentum conservation. Instead, this would be analogous to the way in which Coleman [9] proposed that baby universes may adjust effective coupling constants in our universe (such as setting the cosmological constant or gravitating energy density to zero) via wormholes (the analogue of Descartes' pineal glands [10] ).
There are also other less conservative ways in which one might postulate that mind affects matter. For example, one might imagine a modification of the action in a coordinate-dependent way, so that coordinate invariance is broken. Or, one might imagine that the quantum state is modified in such a way that it cannot be given by any Feynman path integral with any form of the action.
Another way in which the mental world might affect the physical world is by changing the boundary conditions of the path integral that defines the quantum state in terms of the actional functional. As in all the ways mentioned so far, once the modified quantum state of the physical world is determined, the framework of Sensible Quantum Mechanics could apply without alteration.
One might go on to consider mind-body interactions which violate the framework of Sensible Quantum Mechanics. For example, one might consider quantum theories in which the wavefunction really collapses. Then one might imagine that the mental world could conceivably influence the time at which a collapse occurs, the eigenbasis in which the collapse takes place, and the specific eigenvector outcome (if it indeed results in a pure state).
Another proposal that could not be incorporated within Sensible Quantum Mechanics is that the measure on sets of conscious perceptions is not determined by expectation values in the quantum state but rather is determined by the trajectory in configuration space that is an essential part of the formalism of Bohm's version of quantum mechanics [11] . This by itself need not lead to any influence of mind on matter, but one could imagine modifications in which the mental world affects the Bohmian trajectories, say by providing a new consciousness force.
Finally, to get to a proposal in which one can consider the possibility of information loss in conscious beings, one might hypothesize that conscious perceptions are new perceptual degrees of freedom that simply have not been included previously in physics. For example, they might be quantum variables, new arguments of the wavefunction of the extended world. (Alternatively, they might be semiclassical variables in a hybrid semiclassical theory, so that the perceptions themselves, and not just the measures on sets of them, are determined by expectation values of the quantum physical variables and may also act back to affect the quantum state itself. However, I shall not consider this possibility further here.)
Presumably these new quantum variables of conscious perceptions would interact with the old ones (which I shall continue to call the physical world or matter, since it or its quantum state is what we are now familiar with as the physical world, though I would not object to the terminology of someone else who might prefer to combine both sets of quantum variables in his definition of the physical world, so long as we are clear in each discussion which terminology is being used). This interaction represents the effect of matter on mind and of mind on matter.
Such an interaction allows the conceptual possibility, analogous to what Hawking proposed for black holes, of information loss in conscious beings. For example, one could imagine an initial state which is a product state of a pure state for the (old) physical variables and some arbitrary state of the mental variables. But then as the two variables interact, one gets an entangled state that is no longer a product state and hence no longer gives a pure state for the physical variables when traced out over the mental variables.
So far, this possibility is analogous to information loss into a persisting black hole, which is not very controversial (though the allowed amount might be, particularly for small persisting black hole remnants). But one could ask the question of what happens if one starts with no conscious beings, they evolve out of a state that was initially purely physical, and then they die out. Can the excitations of the mental variables disappear with the conscious beings, say into a mental singularity, taking the information they had with them, so that in the end it no longer resides within the physical universe? This would be analogous to what Hawking proposes happens to the information that falls into a black hole (that had formed out of an initial nonblack-hole state) when (and if) the black hole completely disappears. (Of course, this information loss in conscious beings is by no means required even if conscious beings appear and disappear within the system, since they could be like photons that are emitted and absorbed without any loss of unitarity in ordinary systems [12] . However, here I am exploring the conceptual possibility that consciousness might lead to a loss of information as Hawking proposes black holes do. Admittedly, the analogy between consciousness and black holes is tenuous. The main similarly is that we don't yet understand the quantum nature of either.)
To test whether information is lost in conscious beings, one apparently would need to construct a closed physical system in a particular pure state, wait a sufficient time for conscious beings to evolve and die out, and then measure the system. With a sufficiently large ensemble of similarly-prepared systems and a sufficiently large set of different measurements on the final systems (a number at least of the order of the square of the dimension of the relevant Hilbert space for each system), one could in principle determine the density matrix of each and thereby determine to some approximation whether it was pure (assuming the systems were sufficiently isolated that they remained uncorrelated, and assuming that they each evolved the same way to identical final density matrices). Of course, in practice it would be impossible to perform most of the large number of measurements needed, and there might even be restrictions in principle to performing them, since measurements are restricted to the interactions actually occurring in nature, and since one has the restrictions of the properties of the quantum state of the universe (e.g., the second law of thermodynamics) [12] .
Even if the measurements were really possible in principle, which I shall assume for the sake of argument, the experiment would be extremely difficult, since one might need to wait for a few billion years for conscious beings to evolve and die out. One would presumably also need each system to be large in order to contain an energy source such as the sun to last long enough in it. There also needs to be a large enough garbage dump for the waste energy.
For example, in shining at its present luminosity for the age of the earth, the sun produces about 5.5 × 10 50 ergs of energy. If this is to be uniformly distributed as thermal radiation over a volume large enough that the temperature be low enough for the thermal disequilibrium necessary for life on earth, say below the freezing point of water, one needs a volume bigger than about 1.3 × 10 55 cm 3 , which fills out a sphere of radius larger than about half a parsec or 1.5 light years. In units of Boltzmann's constant, the entropy of this radiation is more than about 1.94 × 10 64 . The exponential of this gives a rough estimate of the dimension of the relevant Hilbert space, so one might need far more than 10 10 64.59 measurements to determine approximately all the relevant elements of the final density matrix of each system (presuming each is identical and uncorrelated).
One might well need much larger individual systems and corresponding many, many more measurements if one wanted a significant probability that conscious beings would evolve in each. There is of course the staggering problem of where to put all of these enormously many systems, since they must be kept far enough apart that they do not interact enough to become sufficiently correlated. (A crude estimate of the requirement that the tidal interaction energy between the systems, varying as the inverse cube of the distance, be less than the splitting of the energy levels within one of the systems, puts the minimum distance between them as more than 10 10 63.81 light years The difference between the upper exponent here and that previous is very nearly the common logarithm of twice three, or six, and different plausible assumptions about the power law in the distance-dependence of the interaction energy would simply change this integer a bit but would leave the minimum separation distance utterly enormous.)
Thus the experimental problem of determining whether or not information is fundamentally lost in conscious beings seems utterly impractical. However, it is still trivial compared to the problem of determining experimentally whether or not information is lost down black holes of the solar mass M ⊙ = 9.14 × 10 37 in Planck units, which have thermal entropies around 4πM 2 ⊙ ∼ 10 76.66 and would require more than 10 10 76.96 measurements to give a rough determination of the final density matrix after black hole evaporates.
One can also amusingly calculate that if information is not lost, the Poincaré recurrence time of an isolated black hole in a rigid nonpermeable box with stationary boundary conditions should be of the order of the exponential of the number of energy eigenstates with significant quantum components, which itself should be of the order of the exponential of the thermal entropy. Therefore, for a black hole of the solar mass, the Poincaré recurrence time should be of the order of Planck times, millenia, or whatever. (14) For a black hole containing the mass within the presently visible region of our universe, it should be of the order of t Poincaré ∼ 10 Planck times, millenia, or whatever.
Finally, if one takes the mass within what may be the entire universe in one of Linde's stochastic inflationary models [13] with a massive inflaton whose mass is about m = 10 −6 in Planck units, and puts this mass into a black hole in a suitable box, one should get a Poincaré recurrence time of the order of Planck times, millenia, or whatever.
(16) So far as I know, these are the longest finite times that have so far been explicitly calculated by any physicist.
I should again emphasize that I do not have strong reasons for proposing that information is actually lost in conscious beings, but it does seem to be a logical possibility, on a rather similar level to Hawking's proposal [3] of information loss down black holes. However, it is obvious from my papers [4, 5] that I am sceptical of the latter, and I am similarly sceptical of the former.
On the other hand, even if information is not fundamentally lost down either black holes or conscious beings, so that the evolution that includes them in the intermediate states is described by a unitary S-matrix, one can still ask whether these S-matrices are predictable in terms of presently-known physics. In the black hole case it is fairly obvious that the S-matrix is not, because we do not yet have a complete understandable quantum theory of gravity. In the case of conscious beings, if their evolution can occur in situations in which nonlinear quantum gravity and black holes have negligible effects or probabilities of occurring, one might suppose that the S-matrix should be accurately described by the present Standard Model of particle physics (presumably augmented by enough gravitational interactions to give a good approximation to Solar System dynamics).
Of course, we do not know the parameters of the Standard Model nearly accurately enough for a calculation of the evolution of any large piece of matter for any significant time (even for a calculation in principle, by computational or even noncomputational means with unlimited resources). But one might ask whether there is any precise choice of the unknown parameters, in the present form of the Standard Model Lagrangian (including a sufficient amount of gravity), that would give the S-matrix up to the accuracy that one would expect from, say, its neglect of quantum nonlinear gravity and of Grand Unified processes such as baryon decay.
To test this by the procedure outlined above of actually measuring an ensemble of initial and final systems seems inordinately difficult. One might hope to be able to test it for a single conscious being, but to do that without letting the being evolve naturally in a very large system over a very long time, one would need to know how to create it, which might be difficult. Although by measuring the physical states of enough conscious beings, one might learn how to create them on scales much smaller than the Solar System, the scale and thermal entropy would still presumably be sufficiently large that the number of measurements needed would still be utterly enormous. (For example, a human of mass 70 kg has a dimensionless thermal entropy on the order of 2 × 10 28 and so would require of the order of 10 measurements to determine the S-matrix.) If these measurements could be done and were consistent with unitary evolution (so that no information is fundamentally lost in the conscious beings), then I would not be surprised to find that the S-matrix is not consistent with the Standard Model with any choice of its parameters. Whether the difference would be attributed to other new physics that has no particular connection with consciousness, or whether it would be attributed to effects of consciousness, is an interesting question that will have to wait until we gain a better understanding of these matters.
